

QcBits:  
constant-time small-key code-based cryptography

Tung Chou

Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, The Netherlands



# Coding theory

Linear codes

# Coding theory

## Linear codes

- a linear subspace in  $\mathbb{F}_2^N$

# Coding theory

## Linear codes

- a linear subspace in  $\mathbb{F}_2^N$
- can be defined by a **parity-check matrix**  $H$ , e.g.,

$$C = \{c \mid Hc = 0\}$$

# Coding theory

## Linear codes

- a linear subspace in  $\mathbb{F}_2^N$
- can be defined by a **parity-check matrix**  $H$ , e.g.,

$$C = \{c \mid Hc = 0\}$$

## Decoding

# Coding theory

## Linear codes

- a linear subspace in  $\mathbb{F}_2^N$
- can be defined by a **parity-check matrix**  $H$ , e.g.,

$$C = \{c \mid Hc = 0\}$$

## Decoding

- compute  $e$  (or  $c$ ) given  $c + e$ , where  $e$  is of weight  $\leq t$

# Coding theory

## Linear codes

- a linear subspace in  $\mathbb{F}_2^N$
- can be defined by a **parity-check matrix**  $H$ , e.g.,

$$C = \{c \mid Hc = 0\}$$

## Decoding

- compute  $e$  (or  $c$ ) given  $c + e$ , where  $e$  is of weight  $\leq t$
- compute  $e$  given the **syndrome**  $He = H(c + e)$



## Code-based encryption

- McEliece versus Niederreiter

	plaintext	ciphertext
McEliece	$c$	$c + e$
Niederreiter	$e$	$H^* e$

## Code-based encryption

- McEliece versus Niederreiter

	plaintext	ciphertext
McEliece	$c$	$c + e$
Niederreiter	$e$	$H^* e$

- General shape

McEliece/Niederreiter + **some code**

## Binary-Goppa and QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

## Binary-Goppa and QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

	Binary Goppa codes	QC-MDPC codes
Confidence	unbroken since 1978	unbroken since 2013

## Binary-Goppa and QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

	Binary Goppa codes	QC-MDPC codes
Confidence	unbroken since 1978	unbroken since 2013
Efficiency	fast (McBits, CHES 2013)	not so fast

## Binary-Goppa and QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

	Binary Goppa codes	QC-MDPC codes
Confidence	unbroken since 1978	unbroken since 2013
Efficiency	fast (McBits, CHES 2013)	not so fast
Key size	$\approx$ 100 kilobytes	$\approx$ 1 kilobyte

## Timeline


2013 • QC-MDPC McEliece (ISIT)

## Timeline


- 2013 • QC-MDPC McEliece (ISIT)  
• *Bochum people felt like implementing it...*




## Timeline

- 
- 2013 • QC-MDPC McEliece (ISIT)
    - *Bochum people felt like implementing it...*
    - on FPGAs (CHES)
  - 2014 • on FPGAs, microcontrollers (PQCrypto, DATE)
  - 2015 • on Haswell CPUs (ACM-TECS)
  - 2016 • on microcontrollers (PQCrypto)

## Timeline


- 
- 2013 • QC-MDPC McEliece (ISIT)
    - *Bochum people felt like implementing it...*
    - on FPGAs (CHES)
  - 2014 • on FPGAs, microcontrollers (PQCrypto, DATE)
  - 2015 • on Haswell CPUs (ACM-TECS)
  - 2016 • on microcontrollers (PQCrypto)
  - **QcBits (new)**

## Timeline

- 
- 2013 • QC-MDPC McEliece (ISIT)
    - *Bochum people felt like implementing it...*
    - on FPGAs (CHES)
  - 2014 • on FPGAs, microcontrollers (PQCrypto, DATE)
  - 2015 • on Haswell CPUs (ACM-TECS)
  - 2016 • on microcontrollers (PQCrypto)
  - **QcBits (new)**

The problem is timing attacks.

## Timeline

- 
- 2013 • QC-MDPC McEliece (ISIT)
    - *Bochum people felt like implementing it...*
    - on FPGAs (CHES)
  - 2014 • on FPGAs, microcontrollers (PQCrypto, DATE)
  - 2015 • on Haswell CPUs (ACM-TECS)
  - 2016 • on microcontrollers (PQCrypto)
  - **QcBits (new)**

The problem is timing attacks.


## Timeline

- 
- 2013 • QC-MDPC McEliece (ISIT)
    - *Bochum people felt like implementing it...*
    - on FPGAs (CHES)
  - 2014 • on FPGAs, microcontrollers (PQCrypto, DATE)
  - 2015 • on Haswell CPUs (ACM-TECS)
  - 2016 • on microcontrollers (PQCrypto)
  - **QcBits (new)**

The problem is timing attacks.

- PQCrypto 2014: constant-time operations **assuming no caches**

## Timeline



The problem is timing attacks.

- PQCrypto 2014: constant-time operations **assuming no caches**
- QcBits: constant-time for a **wide-variety of 32/64-bit platforms**

## Performance results

platform	key-pair	encrypt	decrypt	reference	scheme
Haswell	784 192	82 732	1 560 072	<b>(new) QcBits</b> ACMTECS 2015	KEM/DEM McEliece
	14 234 347	34 123	3 104 624		
Cortex-M4	140 372 822	2 244 489	14 679 937	<b>(new) QcBits</b> PQCrypto 2016 PQCrypto 2014	KEM/DEM KEM/DEM McEliece
	63 185 108	2 623 432	18 416 012		
	148 576 008	7 018 493	42 129 589		

Cycle counts for key-pair generation, encryption, and decryption for 80-bit pre-quantum security. Numbers in **RED** are **non-constant-time**. Numbers in **BLUE** are **constant-time**.

## QC-MDPC codes



## QC-MDPC codes

- MDPC: moderate-density-parity-check

## QC-MDPC codes

- MDPC: moderate-density-parity-check
- QC: quasi-cyclic (for saving bandwidth and memory)

## QC-MDPC codes

- MDPC: moderate-density-parity-check
- QC: quasi-cyclic (for saving bandwidth and memory)

$$\left( H^{(0)} \quad H^{(1)} \right) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times 2n}$$

## QC-MDPC codes

- MDPC: moderate-density-parity-check
- QC: quasi-cyclic (for saving bandwidth and memory)

$$\left( H^{(0)} \quad H^{(1)} \right) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times 2n}$$

QcBits:

- $[n = 4801, w = 90, t = 84]$  for 80-bit security

## QC-MDPC codes

- MDPC: moderate-density-parity-check
- QC: quasi-cyclic (for saving bandwidth and memory)

$$\left( H^{(0)} \quad H^{(1)} \right) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times 2n}$$

QcBits:

- $[n = 4801, w = 90, t = 84]$  for 80-bit security
- further requires  $H^{(i)}$  to have row weight  $w/2$   
(same for the Bochum papers)

## Statistical decoding

Start with finding  $v = c + e$  such that  $H^* v = H^* e$ . Compute  $Hv$ .

## Statistical decoding

Start with finding  $v = c + e$  such that  $H^*v = H^*e$ . Compute  $Hv$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

## Statistical decoding

Start with finding  $v = c + e$  such that  $H^*v = H^*e$ . Compute  $Hv$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$



## Statistical decoding

Start with finding  $v = c + e$  such that  $H^*v = H^*e$ . Compute  $Hv$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

+) 

---

$$u = (2 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n}$$

## Statistical decoding

Start with finding  $v = c + e$  such that  $H^*v = H^*e$ . Compute  $Hv$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

+) 

---

$$u = (2 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n}$$

Flip  $v_j$  if  $u_j$  is large. Repeat until  $Hv = 0$ .

## Statistical decoding

Start with finding  $v = c + e$  such that  $H^*v = H^*e$ . Compute  $Hv$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

+) 

---

$$u = (2 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n}$$

Flip  $v_j$  if  $u_j$  is large. Repeat until  $Hv = 0$ .

Rationale

## Statistical decoding

Start with finding  $v = c + e$  such that  $H^*v = H^*e$ . Compute  $Hv$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

+) 

---

$$u = (2 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n}$$

Flip  $v_j$  if  $u_j$  is large. Repeat until  $Hv = 0$ .

Rationale

- parity=0: perhaps no errors. no information.

## Statistical decoding

Start with finding  $v = c + e$  such that  $H^*v = H^*e$ . Compute  $Hv$ .

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

+) 

---

$$u = (2 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n}$$

Flip  $v_j$  if  $u_j$  is large. Repeat until  $Hv = 0$ .

Rationale

- parity=0: perhaps no errors. no information.
- parity=1: one score for each possible position.

# Statistical decoding

Natural questions

# Statistical decoding

## Natural questions

- what do you mean by higher probability? (don't know)

# Statistical decoding

## Natural questions

- what do you mean by higher probability? (don't know)
- repeat how many times? (don't know)



# Statistical decoding

## Natural questions

- what do you mean by higher probability? (don't know)
- repeat how many times? (don't know)
- always work? (probably not)

# Statistical decoding

## Natural questions

- what do you mean by higher probability? (don't know)
- repeat how many times? (don't know)
- always work? (probably not)
- constant-time iterations?

## Statistical decoding: naive approach

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \mathbf{v} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

## Statistical decoding: naive approach

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

+) 

---

$$u = (2 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n}$$

## Statistical decoding: naive approach

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

+) 

---

$$u = (2 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n}$$

Step 1 computing the syndrome:  $O(n^2)$

## Statistical decoding: naive approach

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

+) 

---

$$u = (2 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n}$$

Step 1 computing the syndrome:  $O(n^2)$

Step 2 computing the unsatisfied parity checks:  $O(n^2)$

## Statistical decoding: naive approach

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} v = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

+) 

---

$$u = (2 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0 \ 2) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n}$$

Step 1 computing the syndrome:  $O(n^2)$

Step 2 computing the unsatisfied parity checks:  $O(n^2)$

- Bochum strategy: compute  $u_0$ , flip  $v_0$ , compute  $u_1$ , flip  $u_1$ , etc.

## Syndrome computation: polynomial view

$$f, g \in \mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^n - 1)$$



## Syndrome computation: polynomial view

$$f, g \in \mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^n - 1)$$

↓

$$\begin{pmatrix} f_0 & f_{n-1} & \dots & f_1 & g_0 & g_{n-1} & \dots & g_1 \\ f_1 & f_0 & \dots & f_2 & g_1 & g_0 & \dots & g_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_{n-1} & f_{n-2} & \dots & f_0 & g_{n-1} & g_{n-2} & \dots & g_0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} v_0 \\ v_1 \\ \vdots \\ v_{2n-1} \end{pmatrix} = s$$

## Syndrome computation: polynomial view

$$f, g \in \mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^n - 1)$$

↓

$$\begin{pmatrix} f_0 & f_{n-1} & \dots & f_1 & g_0 & g_{n-1} & \dots & g_1 \\ f_1 & f_0 & \dots & f_2 & g_1 & g_0 & \dots & g_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_{n-1} & f_{n-2} & \dots & f_0 & g_{n-1} & g_{n-2} & \dots & g_0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} v_0 \\ v_1 \\ \vdots \\ v_{2n-1} \end{pmatrix} = s$$

↓

$$\left( f \quad xf \quad \dots \quad x^{n-1}f \quad g \quad xg \quad \dots \quad x^{n-1}g \right) \begin{pmatrix} v_0 \\ v_1 \\ \vdots \\ v_{2n-1} \end{pmatrix} = s$$

## Syndrome computation: polynomial view

$$f, g \in \mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^n - 1)$$

↓

$$\begin{pmatrix} f_0 & f_{n-1} & \dots & f_1 & g_0 & g_{n-1} & \dots & g_1 \\ f_1 & f_0 & \dots & f_2 & g_1 & g_0 & \dots & g_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_{n-1} & f_{n-2} & \dots & f_0 & g_{n-1} & g_{n-2} & \dots & g_0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} v_0 \\ v_1 \\ \vdots \\ v_{2n-1} \end{pmatrix} = s$$

↓

$$\begin{pmatrix} f & xf & \dots & x^{n-1}f & g & xg & \dots & x^{n-1}g \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} v_0 \\ v_1 \\ \vdots \\ v_{2n-1} \end{pmatrix} = s$$

↓

$$s = v^{(0)}f + v^{(1)}g \in \mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^n - 1)$$

## Sparse-times-dense polynomial in $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^n - 1)$

QcBits computes  $vf$  as

$$x^{i_1} v + x^{i_2} v + \dots$$

- Each  $x^i v$  is simply a rotation of  $v$ .

## Sparse-times-dense polynomial in $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^n - 1)$

QcBits computes  $vf$  as

$$x^{i_1} v + x^{i_2} v + \dots$$

- Each  $x^i v$  is simply a rotation of  $v$ .

## Sparse-times-dense polynomial in $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^n - 1)$

QcBits computes  $vf$  as

$$x^{i_1} v + x^{i_2} v + \dots$$

- Each  $x^i v$  is simply a rotation of  $v$ .
- Addition can be carried out using XOR instructions.

## Sparse-times-dense polynomial in $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(x^n - 1)$

QcBits computes  $vf$  as

$$x^{i_1} v + x^{i_2} v + \dots$$

- Each  $x^i v$  is simply a rotation of  $v$ .
- Addition can be carried out using XOR instructions.
- Constant-time rotations?

## Barrel Shifter

Rotating by  $i = (i_k i_{k-1} \dots i_0)_2$  bits:



## Barrel Shifter

Rotating by  $i = (i_k i_{k-1} \dots i_0)_2$  bits:

- conditionally rotate by  $2^k$  bits.

## Barrel Shifter

Rotating by  $i = (i_k i_{k-1} \dots i_0)_2$  bits:

- conditionally rotate by  $2^k$  bits.
- conditionally rotate by  $2^{k-1}$  bits, and so on.

## Barrel Shifter

Rotating by  $i = (i_k i_{k-1} \dots i_0)_2$  bits:

- conditionally rotate by  $2^k$  bits.
- conditionally rotate by  $2^{k-1}$  bits, and so on.
- Example for  $i = 010011_2$  and polynomial

$$(x^8 + x^{10} + x^{12} + x^{14}) + (x^{16} + x^{17} + x^{20} + x^{21}) + (x^{24} + x^{25} + x^{26} + x^{27}) + (x^{36} + x^{37} + x^{38} + x^{39})$$

## Barrel Shifter

Rotating by  $i = (i_k i_{k-1} \dots i_0)_2$  bits:

- conditionally rotate by  $2^k$  bits.
- conditionally rotate by  $2^{k-1}$  bits, and so on.
- Example for  $i = 010011_2$  and polynomial

$$(x^8 + x^{10} + x^{12} + x^{14}) + (x^{16} + x^{17} + x^{20} + x^{21}) + (x^{24} + x^{25} + x^{26} + x^{27}) + (x^{36} + x^{37} + x^{38} + x^{39})$$

---

00000000<sub>2</sub>    01010101<sub>2</sub>    00110011<sub>2</sub>    00001111<sub>2</sub>    11110000<sub>2</sub>

## Barrel Shifter

Rotating by  $i = (i_k i_{k-1} \dots i_0)_2$  bits:

- conditionally rotate by  $2^k$  bits.
- conditionally rotate by  $2^{k-1}$  bits, and so on.
- Example for  $i = 010011_2$  and polynomial

$$(x^8 + x^{10} + x^{12} + x^{14}) + (x^{16} + x^{17} + x^{20} + x^{21}) + (x^{24} + x^{25} + x^{26} + x^{27}) + (x^{36} + x^{37} + x^{38} + x^{39})$$

	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>
<u>010011<sub>2</sub></u>	<u>01010101<sub>2</sub></u>	<u>00110011<sub>2</sub></u>	<u>00001111<sub>2</sub></u>	<u>11110000<sub>2</sub></u>	<u>00000000<sub>2</sub></u>

## Barrel Shifter

Rotating by  $i = (i_k i_{k-1} \dots i_0)_2$  bits:

- conditionally rotate by  $2^k$  bits.
- conditionally rotate by  $2^{k-1}$  bits, and so on.
- Example for  $i = 010011_2$  and polynomial

$$(x^8 + x^{10} + x^{12} + x^{14}) + (x^{16} + x^{17} + x^{20} + x^{21}) + (x^{24} + x^{25} + x^{26} + x^{27}) + (x^{36} + x^{37} + x^{38} + x^{39})$$

	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>
010011 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>	00000000 <sub>2</sub>
010011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>

## Barrel Shifter

Rotating by  $i = (i_k i_{k-1} \dots i_0)_2$  bits:

- conditionally rotate by  $2^k$  bits.
- conditionally rotate by  $2^{k-1}$  bits, and so on.
- Example for  $i = 010011_2$  and polynomial

$$(x^8 + x^{10} + x^{12} + x^{14}) + (x^{16} + x^{17} + x^{20} + x^{21}) + (x^{24} + x^{25} + x^{26} + x^{27}) + (x^{36} + x^{37} + x^{38} + x^{39})$$

	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>
<u>010011<sub>2</sub></u>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>	00000000 <sub>2</sub>
010011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>
010011 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>

## Barrel Shifter

Rotating by  $i = (i_k i_{k-1} \dots i_0)_2$  bits:

- conditionally rotate by  $2^k$  bits.
- conditionally rotate by  $2^{k-1}$  bits, and so on.
- Example for  $i = 010011_2$  and polynomial

$$(x^8 + x^{10} + x^{12} + x^{14}) + (x^{16} + x^{17} + x^{20} + x^{21}) + (x^{24} + x^{25} + x^{26} + x^{27}) + (x^{36} + x^{37} + x^{38} + x^{39})$$

	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>
010011 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>	00000000 <sub>2</sub>
010011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>
010011 <sub>2</sub>	00110011 <sub>2</sub>	00001111 <sub>2</sub>	11110000 <sub>2</sub>	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	01010101 <sub>2</sub>
010011 <sub>2</sub>	01100001 <sub>2</sub>	11111110 <sub>2</sub>	00000000 <sub>2</sub>	00001010 <sub>2</sub>	10100110 <sub>2</sub>



## Computing $u$ : polynomial view

$$f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n - 1)$$

## Computing $u$ : polynomial view

$$f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n - 1)$$

↓

$$\begin{pmatrix} f_0 & f_1 & \dots & f_{n-1} & g_0 & g_1 & \dots & g_{n-1} \\ f_{n-1} & f_0 & \dots & f_{n-2} & g_{n-1} & g_0 & \dots & g_{n-2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_1 & f_2 & \dots & f_0 & g_1 & g_2 & \dots & g_0 \end{pmatrix}_V = \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ s_1 \\ \vdots \\ s_{n-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

## Computing $u$ : polynomial view

$$f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n - 1)$$

↓

$$\begin{pmatrix} f_0 & f_1 & \dots & f_{n-1} & g_0 & g_1 & \dots & g_{n-1} \\ f_{n-1} & f_0 & \dots & f_{n-2} & g_{n-1} & g_0 & \dots & g_{n-2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_1 & f_2 & \dots & f_0 & g_1 & g_2 & \dots & g_0 \end{pmatrix}_V = \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ s_1 \\ \vdots \\ s_{n-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

↓

$$\begin{pmatrix} f & g \\ xf & xg \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ x^{n-1}f & x^{n-1}g \end{pmatrix}_V = \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ s_1 \\ \vdots \\ s_{n-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

## Computing $u$ : polynomial view

$$f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n - 1)$$

↓

$$\begin{pmatrix} f_0 & f_1 & \dots & f_{n-1} & g_0 & g_1 & \dots & g_{n-1} \\ f_{n-1} & f_0 & \dots & f_{n-2} & g_{n-1} & g_0 & \dots & g_{n-2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ f_1 & f_2 & \dots & f_0 & g_1 & g_2 & \dots & g_0 \end{pmatrix}_V = \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ s_1 \\ \vdots \\ s_{n-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

↓

$$\begin{pmatrix} f & g \\ xf & xg \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ x^{n-1}f & x^{n-1}g \end{pmatrix}_V = \begin{pmatrix} s_0 \\ s_1 \\ \vdots \\ s_{n-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

↓

$$u = (sf, sg) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n - 1)$$

# The future of QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

## The future of QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

How to deal with **decoding failures**?

## The future of QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

How to deal with **decoding failures**?

- QcBits for higher security levels?

## The future of QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

How to deal with **decoding failures**?

- QcBits for higher security levels?
- better decoder?



## The future of QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

How to deal with **decoding failures**?

- QcBits for higher security levels?
- better decoder?
- better parameters?

## The future of QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

How to deal with **decoding failures**?

- QcBits for higher security levels?
- better decoder?
- better parameters?

Is equal weight distribution ok?

## The future of QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

How to deal with **decoding failures**?

- QcBits for higher security levels?
- better decoder?
- better parameters?

Is equal weight distribution ok?

- at least it's close enough to the original proposal

## The future of QC-MDPC McEliece/Niederreiter

How to deal with **decoding failures**?

- QcBits for higher security levels?
- better decoder?
- better parameters?

Is equal weight distribution ok?

- at least it's close enough to the original proposal

**More research is required to build up confidence.**

[www.win.tue.nl/~tchou/qcbits/](http://www.win.tue.nl/~tchou/qcbits/)