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### Small Devices: D1.5 Intermediate Report on Physical Attacks

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# Small Devices: D1.5 Intermediate Report on Physical Attacks

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## **Abstract**

This document provides the PQCRYPTO project's intermediate report for post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that focus small devices. Algorithms are selected based on a level on confidence and their suitability for the constraints of small embedded devices.

**Keywords:** Post-quantum cryptography, small devices, hardware devices, microcontrollers, physical attacks, side-channel analysis



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## 1 Introduction

PQCRYPTO recommends algorithms for encryption, digital signatures, and key exchange that are believed to withstand mathematical attacks even if those are carried out by quantum computers. However, implementations of these algorithms might still be vulnerable to physical attacks. Especially embedded applications are vulnerable to these kind of attacks since the attacker is in possession of the device which executes the algorithm. Such an adversary is free to not only control the input to the device and closely monitor the device, observing its physical properties whilst it performs the cryptographic operations. These physical variables, such as the timings required to perform computations, or the instantaneous power consumed during execution of the algorithm, may be sampled and recorded and used to derive intermediate values of the algorithms. In this report we examine possible attack vectors for implementations of post-quantum algorithms and discuss possible countermeasures to prevent these kind of attacks. We also give an overview of the state of the art in the field of side-channel analysis of post-quantum cryptography.

## 2 Physical Attacks

In this section, we discuss attacks exploiting physical properties of an implementation to gain knowledge of the secret key used in the executed algorithm. One distinguishes between passive attacks in which the attacker only monitors information, like execution time, power consumption, or electromagnetic radiation, and active attacks in which the attacker is allowed to interfere in the execution of the cipher.

When dealing with active attacks, one distinguishes between different levels of invasiveness. A non-invasive attacker is only allowed to modify the environment like the temperature, the voltage of the power supply, or the duration of clock cycles. These attacks usually aim to generate a faulty result that can be used to reveal the secret key. A semi-invasive attacker removes the package material of the device and introduces faults by shooting at the a specific location at the device with light or electromagnetic radiation. Invasive attackers aim to even alter the device itself and reverse-engineer the implementation.

Implementations are vulnerable to timing attacks if their execution time depends on secret data. Power analysis exploits the fact that in CMOS technology the dynamic power consumption is dominating in comparison to the static power consumption. An attacker executes the algorithm and measures the power consumption during the execution. The most important types of attacks on the power consumption leakage are simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA).

### 2.1 Fault attacks

The idea of fault attacks is to induce a fault into a circuit and use the faulty output to get information about the secret key. This can be achieved by high temperature, unsupported supply voltage or current, excessively high overclocking, strong electric or magnetic fields, or even ionizing radiation. Fault attacks are usually non-invasive as the induced fault is only temporary and the device is not permanently damaged. The most prominent fault attack in cryptography was carried out by Boneh et al. [5]. Their attack on RSA-CRT signatures requires only one (arbitrary) faulty output and one correct output to break the scheme.

## 2.2 Timing attacks

When implementing cryptographic algorithms, the developer has to make sure that the execution time is independent of the secret data that is processed. Otherwise an attacker might be able to exploit the information about the execution time. Such attacks should not only be considered for embedded devices for which the attacker has physical access to, but also remote timing attacks are a threat that must be considered as shown by Brumley and Boneh [7]. Timing information can be leaked by conditional branches, instructions with non-constant execution time, and memory accesses that trigger cache hits or misses [2].

## 2.3 Simple power analysis

Simple power analysis [19] works similar to timing attacks. However, while timing attacks exploit the timing information of one or many executions of the algorithms, one or a few power traces of the executed algorithms are used to perform a simple power analysis. An attacker uses visual examination to identify leaking instructions whose execution depends on secret data. Thus, this attack is especially effective when the order of the executed instructions differs from run to run. For instance, an RSA implementation with a naive implementation of the square-and-multiply algorithm can easily be broken by SPA as the square operations and multiply operations are usually easily distinguishable in the power trace. Signal-processing techniques, like frequency filters, might improve the result and make the visual inspection easier.

## 2.4 Differential power analysis

While SPA targets the operation-dependency of the power consumption, DPA exploits its data-dependency. Introduced in 1998 by Kocher et al. [19], DPA (in contrast to SPA) needs many power traces and one analyzes the set of traces with statistical methods. When performing DPA an attacker does not attack the whole key at once, but only a part, e.g. one byte. A DPA is divided in an online phase and an offline phase. During the online phase, the attacker runs a vast amount of executions of the algorithm to be attacked with different inputs and measures the power consumption of the target device during each run. DPA requires a leakage model that is a prediction of the power consumption. Some leakage models are rather simple. For example, the Hamming weight model is based on the observation that the Hamming weight of a value that is stored in a register, influences the power consumption. During the offline phase, the attacker guesses the key byte and computes the intermediate value that he considers suitable to apply the power model to. Depending on the power model and the intermediate value, she assigns the corresponding power trace to one of two sets where one contains power traces with high predicted power consumption and one set contains traces with low prediction power consumption. For all power traces, the attacker stores the difference of the means of the sets. If the attack worked, the correct key guess has a much higher difference of means than the other guesses.

The Hamming weight leakage model is often applied when attacking software implementations. For hardware implementations a promising model is the Hamming distance model. The Hamming distance model assumes that the more bit positions of the input and output values of a circuit differ, the more switching operations happened within a circuit, and the higher is the power consumption. Other models that are more accurate require less traces to

successfully attack a target, but also need a deep knowledge of the implementation that is attacked.

### 2.4.1 t-test

A commonly used methodology for side-channel analysis is the  $t$ -test leakage detection method initially proposed in [15, 11]. For the non-specific *fixed vs. random*  $t$ -test one takes two types of measurements, one with fixed input and one with random input. The  $t$ -statistic  $t$  is computed as

$$t = \frac{\mu_F - \mu_R}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_F^2}{n_F} + \frac{\sigma_R^2}{n_R}}}$$

where  $\mu_F$ ,  $\sigma_F^2$ , and  $n_F$  (resp.  $\mu_R$ ,  $\sigma_R^2$ , and  $n_R$ ) denote the mean, variance, and number of measurements set with fixed input (resp. random input). If the value exceeds the threshold  $|t| > 4.5$ , the test has detected leakage. As this test does not perform an actual attack and does not consider a certain power model it is called *non-specific*. Apart from the *fixed vs. random*  $t$ -test it is also possible to perform a *semi-fixed vs. random*  $t$ -test. Such a test does not fix the input but some intermediate values, e.g. part of the state of a block cipher to get a more accurate result.

## 3 Countermeasures

In this section we discuss different approach to prevent side-channel analysis. Note that there is not a single countermeasure that can be applied to fix all vulnerabilities, in practice usually a combination of countermeasures is applied.

### 3.1 Hiding

Hiding countermeasures are applied to raise the difficulty for an attacker to detect sensitive information in a set of power traces. This can be achieved by introducing additional noise or by trying to equalize the power consumption of all operations.

The first approach can be achieved by other computations that are executed in parallel or by shuffling the order of operations. For hardware implementations one can even instantiate dedicated noise generators to randomize the power consumption. If shuffling is applied an attacker needs to perform an extra alignment step before analyzing the power traces. Otherwise the number of required power traces drastically increases.

The second approach is more suitable for hardware implementations as in microcontrollers the developer has only limited influence on the power consumption of an instruction and only one instruction can be executed in parallel (except the microcontroller features SIMD instructions).

### 3.2 Masking

The idea behind masking is to split a secret value into several shares. The secret value can only be reconstructed with the knowledge of all shares. The splitting of the secret value can be performed in a Boolean way or in an arithmetic way. Boolean masking means that the XOR-sum of all shares results in the secret value and arithmetic masking means that the arithmetic

sum or difference of the shares results in the secret value. There are conversion approaches to switch between arithmetic and Boolean masking [12]. The major advantage of masking schemes is that they allow to prove the side-channel security of an algorithm. Nevertheless, there are still implementation challenges that have to be taken care of. Otherwise, a provably secure algorithm might still have a side-channel leakage. To achieve higher-order security, it is necessary to split the secret value into more shares.

### 3.3 Constant-time implementation

To prevent timing attacks and simple power analysis it is crucial to develop an implementation that has a constant (or at least secret-independent) execution time. Some pitfalls that should be avoided are:

- **Comparison of secret strings:** Such a comparison must not stop at the first unequal character.
- **Branches:** Branches must not be dependent on secret data. Ideally the same branches are taken for every run of the implementation.
- **Table look-ups:** On platforms with a cache, table look-ups can have varying access times. Thus the index must not depend on secret data for such platforms.
- **Compiler optimization:** A developer must take care that the compiler does not remove instructions that are critical for the security of the implementation but irrelevant for its functionality.

### 3.4 Fault countermeasures

The most intuitive way to detect a fault is to utilize redundant computations that are used to check the correctness of the result. Spatial redundancy is a possible countermeasure for hardware implementations and means the same operation is executed twice in parallel. This countermeasure has only a small performance overhead but the area consumption doubles. In contrast to that, temporal redundancy means executing another operation after the original operations has been finished. This can either be an additional decryption after an encryption operation to check whether the result matches the original plaintext or simply another encryption to compare both ciphertexts.

For fault attacks that must induce the fault at a specific point in time, it is also possible to randomize the order of the instructions to make an attack harder. Partial reconfiguration on FPGAs can also be used to randomize the location of the circuit that compute the operation. For linear operations error correcting codes can be used to detect faults.

## 4 Physical security of quantum-secure schemes

In this section, we review the state-of-the-art of research targeting the physical security of post-quantum cryptography. We are not aware of any work related physical attacks on multivariate quadratics and thus we do refrain from discussing these schemes. Similarly, there has not been done much research on side-channel analysis of hash-based primitives yet. However the underlying hash functions have been analyzed thoroughly in works like [3, 28, 30].

## 4.1 Code-based Cryptography

The McEliece encryption scheme [21] has been proposed in 1978 and belongs to the family of code-based cryptography. Much effort has been spent on analyzing the side-channel security of this scheme and developing suitable countermeasures. Simple power analysis of the scheme has been performed for FPGA implementations [22] and microcontroller implementations [18, 29]. These works also show that the attack can be made much harder by providing a timing- and instruction-invariant implementation.

Further more Chen et al. attacked McEliece FPGA implementations with DPA [8, 10]. The authors analyze the syndrome computation and are able to recover the complete secret key with an additional algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key. As countermeasures to the presented attacks, Chen et al. also propose a masking scheme for McEliece in [9] and evaluate the side-channel security of their masked FPGA implementation. Their masking scheme is a hybrid of Boolean and arithmetic masking. The masks are generated on-the-fly using a pseudo-random number generator.

## 4.2 Lattice-based Cryptography

The lattice-based ring learning with errors (R-LWE) encryption scheme [20] has also been analyzed for its resistance against side-channel attacks in several works mainly focusing on DPA. The first approach to secure R-LWE against DPA has been proposed by Reparaz et al. in 2015 [27, 26]. The authors attempt to protect the secret key by splitting it into two shares and perform all operations separately on both shares. However, the last step of the algorithm is a decoding function that is not a linear operation and thus requires the knowledge of both shares. To solve this problem [27] proposed a masked decoder. As this decoder has a number of drawbacks, like being non-deterministic and increasing the failure rate of the scheme, Reparaz et al. [25] proposed another approach in 2016. In [25] not the secret key, but the ciphertext is split into two shares. This approach introduces a heavy computational overhead as it requires another run of the decryption during the encryption. Oder et al. [23] combined the ideas of [27] and [25] to avoid the aforementioned problems and also applied a CCA2-conversion to R-LWE to make it secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attackers. Furthermore the masking scheme from [23] has a proof to support its claim. Additionally, [27, 25, 23] all provide results of practical measurements to demonstrate that the masking schemes indeed prevent a leakage. Oder et al. also discuss the fault sensitivity of R-LWE in [23].

Lattice-based signatures schemes, like BLISS [13] and GLP [16], have also been analyzed for their vulnerability to fault attacks in [4] and [14]. Both papers consider instruction-skipping resulting in potential loop aborts and how to exploit such a fault. The work of Bindel et al. [4] furthermore examines the impact of zeroing or randomization of critical values. The proposed countermeasures mainly boil down to redundant computations that are used for correctness checks. Another proposed countermeasure to prevent instruction-skipping is to deliberately induce a segmentation fault by allocating new memory for every intermediate result.

Bruinderink et al. [6] also found a cache-timing attack on the signature scheme BLISS. More specifically, they attacked the Gaussian sampler that is used to generate noise polynomials in BLISS and are able to extract the secret key with only 3,500 signatures. To prevent timing attacks many implementations of lattice-based schemes provide a constant or secret-independent execution time, like vectorized implementations of the GLP signature scheme and

the New Hope key exchange for Intel CPUs [1, 17]. Furthermore there are also microcontroller implementations of R-LWE that are protected against timing attacks [24, 23].

## 5 Conclusions

The physical security of post-quantum cryptography is essential for embedded applications of these algorithms. The McEliece cryptosystem has already been well researched, however there are still open research questions, like higher-order attacks. First works on side-channel analysis and countermeasures for lattice-based cryptosystems also exist. Nevertheless, there is a great variety of lattice-based cryptosystems and so far most work has focused on R-LWE and signature schemes only. Hash-based signature schemes, like XMSS and SPHINCS and MQ-based schemes are also interesting to look at from a side-channel perspective.

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